This paper examines the relationship of war to power concentration and alliance configuration among the major powers. It does so by developing a theoretical argument from the literature on bipolarity and multipolarity. The paper suggests that bipolarity has two components &mdash; power distribution and alliance clustering. The two, it is argued, have 'opposite' effects on warfare in the major power system: power bipolarity minimizes the magnitude of those wars that do break out, while alliance bipolarity increases the likelihood that a war will occur. Correlational evidence, drawn from the Correlates of War data set, is supportive of both hypotheses for the twentieth century. The power polarity hypothesis is also confirmed for the nineteenth century, but the alliance polarity hypothesis seems disconfirmed for that century, perhaps because of the effects of hostility on the balance of power alliance structures of that era. The conceptual framework and findings of the present paper allow one the reexamine the classic debate on the relative probabilities of war in bipolar and multipolar systems. The insights of Deutsch and Singer on the one hand and Waltz on the other appear to be more consistent with each other than heretofore recognized. Key elements of both the Waltz and the Deutsch and Singer arguments are supported by the findings. On the other hand, more recent, empirical studies by Bueno de Mesquita and others are critiqued on the basis of the present paper's theoretical perspective and empirical findings.
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Polarization and war
One of the great debates in the study of international conflict involves the relation between the polarization of an international system and the outbreak of war.' In its classic and simplest form, as articulated by Waltz (1964 Waltz ( , 1967 and by Deutsch & Singer (1964) Rapkin et al. (1979) and Snyder & Diesing (1977) , the implications for the classic literature and for empirical research on war and peace have not been adequately examined; the present paper will investigate both such implications. Second, while it is not fully realized by scholars, sometimes the major power system is neither bipolar nor multipolar, but rather purely multipolar on one dimension and purely bipolar on another; the miniscule inter-dimension correlations documented below should help drive this point home and raise serious questions about much of the empirical work that has been done to test the Waltz and Deutsch-Singer hypotheses. Third, the theoretical and empirical work in the present paper increases the support for the contention that (a), contrary to the conventional wisdom, a multipolar power distribution breeds large scale wars, while (b) (1957) , which popularized the discussion of power systems in terms of the ideal types of multipolarity (the classic balance of power) and loose or tight bipolarity. It is a thesis of this paper that the balance of power and alliance polarization should not be treated in terms of such ideal types, but should rather be treated in terms of the variables used to compute the product-moment about the center of a space (Wallace 1973 (Sabrosky 1975 , Knorr 1955 (Dahl 1970, p. 18); (4) the capabilities or power of a set of countries may not be additive when they form an alliance; (5) power is an extremely ambiguous, and perhaps superfluous, concept in social science analysis (Riker 1962 (Riker , 1969 (Kagan 1969 In Table V , war is always positively correlated with subsequent alliance multipolarity: in both centuries, war seems to lead to a dispersion of alliance blocs. In the twentieth century, this cluster multipolarity is followed by peace (see the fourth column of Table V) , as the third hypothesis contends. In the nineteenth century, however, the opposite of the hypothesis seems to hold true, and cluster multipolarity is followed by war (see the sixth column of Table V) . Furthermore, in the nineteenth century, an increase in alliance multipolarity (from ti to t6) is positively correlated (r = .31) with the subsequent magnitude of war (the sum of nation-months from t6 to t 11 ), indicating that prior to war alliance clusters were disintegrating. In the 
